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I. INTRODUCTION
TrT IS 11:00 a.m. as the crew of Flight 101 from Dallas to New
XYork prepares for landing. The passengers on this three-hour
flight use their time in a variety of ways. Some read books or
magazines while others nap or talk to the person sitting next to
them. Many of the passengers use laptop computers, calculators,
dictaphones, or the seat-back cellular telephones to conduct
business while in the air. The younger passengers entertain
themselves with video games or listen to music on their portable
cassette players or compact disc (CD) players. The man in seat
8J even goes to the lavatory for a quick shave using his electric
razor.
The flight attendants walk the aisles to ensure that all seats are
in their full upright position, that all tray tables are put away,
and that the passengers' seat belts are fastened. Anyone who has
flown before is familiar with these airline mandates. Now the
flight attendants have an additional directive-to prevent the
use of computers, video games, CD players, or other portable
electronic devices while the plane is taking off or landing. Ac-
cordingly, a crew member tells the man in the window seat in
Row 2 to turn off his laptop computer. The flight attendant then
walks down the aisle, not knowing that the man has ignored the
attendant's instructions. The man continues to use his com-
puter while the plane makes its final approach, touches down,
and then arrives at the gate.
The passengers who read, napped, or chatted have passed the
time in ways that did not affect the operation of Flight 101.
Those who used portable electronic devices, however, may have
exposed the aircraft's navigation and communication systems to
potentially dangerous radio waves. The man in the second row,
and as a result the airline, violated Federal Aviation Administra-
tion (FAA) regulations during one of the most critical phases of
the flight.
This Comment examines the potential liability where passen-
gers' on-board use of portable electronic devices creates electro-
magnetic interference with aircraft navigation systems. After a
brief description of the source of the problem, Part I reviews the
anecdotal evidence and scientific studies conducted to deter-
mine whether and how such devices interfere with aircraft sys-
tems. Part II examines the current state of the law, including
FAA and Federal Communications Commission (FCC) regula-
tions, legislative history, and individual airline policies. Part III
presents the existing case law on other passenger-created risks to
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predict how the courts may handle airline liability where passen-
gers are injured because: (1) one or more passengers ignore the
airline's policies; (2) the flight attendants enforce an inade-
quate policy; or (3) the flight attendants tell passengers to stop
using their portable electronic devices, but fail to ensure that
the passengers comply with their directions.
II. ELECTROMAGNETIC INTERFERENCE: THE PROBLEM
AND ITS IMPLICATIONS
Concerns about electronic devices and their potential to in-
terfere with aircraft systems date back at least to the 1950s when
the commercial airline industry was in its infancy. The problem
appeared settled in 1964 with the issuance of the FAA's first for-
mal directive permitting in-flight use of certain portable elec-
tronic devices (PEDs) and prohibiting the use of all others.' In
recent years, however, concern about possible interference has
increased, along with the number of electronic devices in use
during flight.2 During the 1,980 presidential campaign, com-
mercial airlines prohibited members of the press from using
their laptop computers during flights between campaign stops
because of concerns about electromagnetic interference
(EMI) .s
Ten or fifteen years ago, few passengers, with the exception of
journalists working on a deadline, routinely used such devices.
As laptop computers, CD players, and a variety of other devices
have become more affordable and easier to carry on-board, the
devices have proliferated. The scene described in the introduc-
tion to this comment is a fairly typical description of the use of
such devices in-flight.
The implications of the problem are evident. Interference
with cockpit navigation systems increases the crew's dependence
on ground control to keep the plane on course. The ground
I Portable FM Radio Receivers, 14 C.F.R. § 91.19 (1964).
2A 1963 study of the problem focused almost exclusively on FM radios. SPE-
CIAL COMM. 88, RADIo TECHNICAL COMM'N FOR AERONAUTICS, INTERFERENCE TO
AIRCRAFT ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT FROM DEVICES CARRIED ABoARD 1 (1963) [here-
inafter SPECIAL COMMrrrEE 88]. A study underway at present includes testing of
approximately 20 different devices. Telephone Interview with Hal Moses, Radio
Technical Comm'n for Aeronautics (Nov. 3, 1994). Concerns have also arisen as
to whether electromagnetic emissions can interfere-perhaps fatally-with medi-
cal devices. Tom Knudson & William M. Bulkeley, Stray Signals: Clutter on Airwaves
Can Block Workings of Medical Electronics, WALL ST. J., June 15, 1994, at Al, A12.
s David Hunter, Cellular Phones & Aircraft, CELLULAR BUS., July 1991, at S12.
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control crew must monitor and direct several aircraft simultane-
ously and must be confident that the cockpit crew will promptly
and accurately follow its instructions. Interference with commu-
nication systems prevents pilots from obtaining critical informa-
tion about the proximity of other airplanes or other hazards.
Misdirection or miscommunication could result in injuries or
fatalities, either as a result of a crash or sudden drastic maneu-
vers taken to avoid a crash.
Industry participants and observers agree that electronic de-
vices emit radio waves. Their opinions diverge sharply, however,
on whether the devices actually threaten cockpit system integrity
and passenger safety and, if so, how the problem should be han-
dled. The FAA, the federal agency charged with fostering and
promoting civil aviation, has put the onus on airlines to study
the problem and develop their own policies. 4 While the Na-
tional Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has never addressed
the subject, its investigators are examining the possible exist-
ence of EMI in connection with the fatal crash of a Boeing 737.5
In truth, the NTSB's interest'in EMI as a cause of this crash
likely stems from the complete lack of any preliminary sign as to
what caused the crash.6
In 1992, the Air Transport Association (ATA), a lobbying
group representing most of the major airlines, asked the FAA to
declare that electronic devices were a safety issue and sought a
coherent, industry-wide policy.7 The FAA declined the invitation
and has limited its participation in the debate to hiring an in-
dependent firm to conduct scientific studies of PEDs and their
effect on aircraft systems." The ATA reasserted the importance
of establishing an industry-wide policy in 1994.9 The Air Line
Pilots Association recommended banning on-board use of all
4 Portable Electronic Devices, 14 C.F.R. § 91.21(b) (5) (1995).
5 USAir Flight 427, Aliquippa, Pa. Safety Board Back to Square One in Probe of Crash
Killing 132 at Pit, AIR SAFETY WK., Sept. 19, 1994, at 2-3 (hereinafter USAir Flight
427].
6 Id. at 3. The plane plunged 6,000 feet and crashed into the countryside.
The weather was clear and there was no indication of engine trouble. All of the
127 passengers and 5 crew members died. GeorgeJ. Church, Ripped From the Sky,
TIME, Sept. 19, 1994, at 38.
7 Edward H. Phillips, ATA Says Key Safety Issues Looming, AVIATION WK. & SPACE
TECH., Feb. 7, 1994, at 32.
8 The Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics (RTCA) has designated
the investigative group "Special Committee 177." A Special RTCA Committee, THE
WKLx Bus. AVIATION, Oct. 17, 1994, at 173.
9 Phillips, supra note 7, at 32.
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PEDs until comprehensive tests are completed.1" At least one
aircraft manufacturer publicly expressed concern that EMI is oc-
curring, possibly as a result of on-board use of damaged PEDs.11
The Cellular Telecommunications Industry Association
(CTIA) asserts that cellular phones, which most airlines prohibit
passengers from using at any time, have been singled out and
unfairly attacked. 12 Not content with FCC regulations and the
FAA's deliberate, slow pace on the cellular phone issue, the
CTIA commissioned its own study of whether the on-ground use
of cellular phones threatens aircraft avionics.' 3 Perhaps re-
sponding to CTIA complaints, the House Appropriations Trans-
portation Subcommittee said that in its report on the fiscal 1994
Transportation Department budget bill "[it] is very upset with
the FAA's promulgation of a rule which is overly restrictive re-
garding the use of portable electronic devices, including cellular
telephones."1 4 The appropriations bill included a provision
"which would prohibit the use of funds for the implementation,
administration or enforcement of' the FAA's only regulation on
the subject. 15
The airlines have developed their own policies for electronic
devices. Typically, passengers may not use devices such as laptop
computers and CD players during take-offs and landings.1 6 A
member of the House Appropriations Transportation Subcom-
mittee declined to address whether airlines have sought to limit
passengers' use of their own portable, electronic devices in an
effort to force them to use the airlines' on-board equipment.17
All of the major airlines have announced plans to expand the
availability of business and entertainment electronics on their
10 Don Phillips, Coffee, Tea or... Hey! Turn Off That Computer!, WASH. POST,
June 20, 1993, at Hl, H6.
11 Boeing advises airlines not to allow any use of electronic devices during
flight. Id. The recommendation by Boeing conflicts with the comments of Jim
Boone, Boeing's director of avionic/flight systems, that "[t]here is no problem"
in reference to tests that Boeing conducted in response to inquiries from airlines,
Corey Sandler, Terror at 66MHz, PC-COMPUTING, Oct. 1993, at 210.
S12 Hunter, supra note 3, at S12. CTIA President Robert W. Maher stated that
"there is no evidence to support a ban on the use of cellular phones while a plane
is parked at a gate or backed up on a taxiway." Id.
13 Id.
14H.R. RP. No. 149, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 45 (1993).
15 H.R. REP. No. 190, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 46 (1993).
16 United to Prohibit Use of Portable Electronic Equipment Below 10, 000 Feet, AvATxION
DAILY, June 23, 1993, at 463.
17 139 CONG. REc. H6878 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 1993) (statement of Rep.
Oberstar).
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planes,18 and some have begun to test interactive systems, albeit
with limited success. 19
A. SCIENTIFIC BACKGROUND
Most aircraft navigation systems rely on a network of very
high-frequency omnidirectional radio range (VOR) stations.2 0
The aircraft receives directional signals from ground-based VOR
transmitters.2 Loran C is a widely used navigation system that
"operates by measuring the difference in arrival times of syn-
chronized radio signals from transmitters located hundreds of
miles apart."2 2 The aircraft's navigation computer processes the
Loran C signals to provide "continuously updated, dead-reckon-
ing navigation data."23
All electronic devices, from electric shavers to hearing aids to
cellular phones, emit radio frequency waves. To prevent inter-
ference, the FCC has allocated distinct bands of frequencies
along the radio spectrum for specialized uses. 4 The frequency
ranges are measured in hertz. For example, VOR frequencies
18 Julie Schmit, Just Plane Noisy, USA TODAY, Oct. 14, 1994, at 1B. GTE Airfone
has introduced phones on which passengers can receive calls, not just make
them. Id.
United Airlines also plans to install interactive passenger entertainment sys-
tems with faxes, video games, and shopping in the business-class and first-class
sections of its Boeing 777s. Jennifer Lawrence, Will Interactive Fly on Planes ? ADvR-
TISING AGE, Oct. 10, 1994, at 16. Singapore Airlines will invest $50 million to
install an interactive video system from Matsushita Avionics Systems in 20 planes
starting in early 1995. Id. at 18. The system will offer "movies, digital audio and
videogames (sic], in-flight shopping and destination information via a video
screen and handheld remote control." Id.
American Airlines plans to offer air-to-ground phone, fax, and data-transmis-
sion services. Michael R. Zimmerman, New Study Debunks Fears Over In-Flight Use of
Laptop PCs, PC WEEK, Sept. 6, 1993, at 6. Long-range plans include planes
equipped with local area networks and.seat-back LCD screens for passenger use.
Id. Nintendo is working with airlines to create in-flight video games. Sharon
Isaak, Carry-On Entertainment: A Crash Course in Plane Safety, ENT. WKLY., Apr. 16,
1993, at 57.
19 Northwest Airlines removed its interactive passenger entertainment systems
because the system, which offered movies, video games, and shopping, was unreli-
able. Lawrence, supra note 18, at 16.
20 1 McGRAw-HILL, INC., ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY 237-39 (7th
ed. 1992). There are approximately 75,000 civil aviation users of Loran C world-
*wide. 10 id. at 186.
21 1 id. at 237-38.
22 Id. at 239.
23 Id. The system also aids pilots by providing course-to-steer data, distance-to-
go to a selected destination, and latitude-longitude coordinates. 10 id. at 185.
24 Frequency Allocations and Radio Treaty Matters, 47 C.F.R. pt. 2 (1994).
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begin at 108MHz, (millions of cycles per second), just above the
band assigned to FM radio, and extend to 117.95MHz. 5 While
electronic devices emit most of their radio waves along the as-
signed band, they also generate harmonics, which are multiple
emissions of the original frequency.2 6 For example, a personal
computer running at 33MHz produces a primary radio fre-
quency at 33MHz and weaker harmonic signals at 66MHz,
99MHz, and 132MHz.2 7 This phenomenon is commonly called
electromagnetic interference or electronic noise, though these
terms often refer more generally to the adverse effect on per-
formance caused by unwanted voltages or currents.28 Airlines
worry that harmonic signals could combine with other radio fre-
quency waves to produce a signal strength equal to or approach-
ing that of VOR frequencies used for aircraft navigation. 9
B. ANECDOTAL EVIDENCE
Voluntary reports by pilots are the primary source of anecdo-
tal evidence of EMI. Information compiled by NASA's Aviation
Safety Reporting System indicates that, between January 1986
and July 1993 pilots have reported 39 cases of possible interfer-
ence in its database of more than 43,000 commercial flight inci-
dents.30 These reports are difficult to verify because it is
impossible to duplicate the original conditions with the same
device, aircraft, location, radio frequency environment, and air-
borne systems' settings.'
25 Sandier, supra note 11, at 213.
26 A harmonic is "a component of a complex vibration (note) which is a simple
multiple of the frequency of the fundamental." P. HARTMANN-PETERSEN & J.N.
PIGFORD, DICTIONARY OF SCIENCE 127 (1984).
27 Sandier, supra note 11, at 213.
28 See generally 6 McGRAw-HiLL, INC., ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SCIENCE & TECHNOL-
oGY 100-01, 155-56 (7th ed. 1992).
29 Sandler,supra note 11, at 213.
3o Id. All reports are voluntary, and reporting biases may lead pilots to attri-
bute incidents to something other than pilot error. Electronic Devices Interfering
With Cockpit Instruments, Crews Report, AVIATION DAILY, Feb. 11, 1993, at 237. Data
gathering may improve, however, because the FAA has authorized airlines to col-
lect and analyze data on mistakes and equipment malfunctions. Matthew L. Wald,
F.A.A. Authorizes Airlines to Collect Data on Mistakes, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 1995, at Al.
The FAA will have access to the information, but pilots and airlines will be im-
mune from liability even if the "black box" system indicates that the airline or
pilot violated FAA regulations. Id.
31 SPECIAL COMM., 156, RADIO TECHNICAL COMM'N FOR AERONAUTICS, 1 POTEN-
TIAL INTERFERENCE TO AIRCRAFT ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT FROM DEVICES CARRIED
ABOARD 5 (1988) [hereinafter SPECIAL COMMITTEE 156].
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Even though unsubstantiated, some of the more recent re-
ports have made their way into the popular press. In May 1992, a
flight crew en route from Houston to New York reportedly ex-
perienced trouble with the plane's communications radio and
asked the flight controllers for a different frequency.12 The
crew switched frequencies and heard music on the new chan-
nel."3 The communication systems immediately returned to
normal after the flight attendant asked passengers to turn off
their FM radios.3 4 In February 1993, Time reported that a bat-
tery-powered CD player being operated in the first-class com-
partment had disrupted an instrument approach of a DC-10
autopilot, nearly causing the plane to crash. 5 The cockpit crew
of a wide-body jet was forced to use back-up systems right after
take-off when the plane's navigational compass went berserk.
On that flight, a passenger in the first-class compartment used a
portable CD player during landing.3 6
Another widely reported incident involved a plane full of foot-
ball fans traveling from Denver to Newark.3 7 Apparently the air-
craft's directional gyros suddenly veered far off the correct
heading. The flight attendants' tour of the cabin revealed
twenty-five passengers listening to a football-game on portable
radios and one passenger using a laptop computer. The gyros
did not return to normal until after the passengers turned off
their devices, but they did so only after repeated announce-
ments and threats of confiscation. 8
32 Sandier, supra note 11, at 211.
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 Janice Castro, Hazardous Music, TIME, Feb. 15, 1993, at 13. The article also
overstated the strength of the available scientific data, claiming that "[e]xperts at
NASA, the National Transportation Safety Board, and the Federal Aviation Ad-
ministration have concluded that stray electronic emissions... can interfere with
flight controls during takeoffs and landings." Id. (emphasis added).
Time repeated the story one week later, referring to (but not describing)
"mounting evidence that.., these gadgets [cassette players, tape recorders and
laptop computeri] may be putting aircraft at risk." Philip Elmer-DeWitt, Hazards
Aloft, TIME, Feb. 22, 1993, at 61. The article also noted ominously that "[n]o
planes have crashed and no lives have been lost-so far." Id.
Officials with the FAA and RTCA point out that the report has never been
corroborated or substantiated. The FAA's associate administrator for regulation
and certification, Anthony M. Broderick, has said "[T]here is no technical basis
for what has been reported." Phillips, supra note 10, at Hi. One RTCA official
described the report in Time as a "bogus event." Moses, supra note 2.





The Malaysian Minister of Transport has announced that pas-
sengers may be required to surrender their portable electronic
devices before boarding.3 9 The proposal is a response to four
incidents of interference with aircraft navigation systems.4a In
the United States, the issue arose most recently after the fatal
September 8, 1994, crash of USAir Flight 427 near Pittsburgh.
Investigators were baffled about what caused the crash but ac-
knowledged that, among many other possible causes, they will
investigate whether passenger-carried electronic devices may
have been the culprit."'
C. SCIENTIFIC STUDIES
There are few formal studies of EMI and its impact on avion-
ics. The first study, conducted by the Radio Technical Commis-
sion for Aeronautics (now known as the RTCA) in 1963, was
limited in scope, focusing primarily on AM/FM radio receiv-
ers.4 2 The report led airlines to ban the use of FM receivers at
any time during flight and the FAA to promulgate Federal Avia-
tion Regulation (FAR) section 91.19, which is essentially the
same as the current regulation.4 3  Since the study was con-
ducted, electronic devices have proliferated and aviation tech-
nology has changed dramatically. As a result, the study is of little
use in assessing the risks today.
More than twenty years passed from the first RTCA study
before EMI was again the subject of scientific studies. In con-
junction with its development of fly-by-wire aircraft systems,
Airbus Industrie's Engineering Support Group tested portable
39 Malaysia Mulls Tough New Rules on Portable Electronic Devices, AIR SAFETY WK.,
Aug. 29, 1994, at 1'.
40 Id. According to Malaysia Airlines officials, the incidents involved a cassette
player, a CD player, a notebook computer, and a cellular telephone. Id. EMI
allegedly resulted in lost flight information, navigation problems, and even a sud-
den, unplanned 30-degree bank. Id.
41 USAir Flight 427, supra note 5, at 3. When asked about the possible role of
on-board electronic devices, NTSB's investigator-in-charge stated that "[t]he
seven-three is basically an old machine; it's cable driven with hydraulics .... We
don't see a major player there, but we'll look into it; it's not fly-by-wire or overly
sophisticated by any means." Id. Time's report of the same crash also raised the
specter of EMI as a possible cause, while acknowledging that there is no conclu-
sive evidence that PEDs interfere with avionics. Church, supra note 6, at 39.
42 See SPECIAL COMMrrrEE 156, supra note 31, at 3; Hunter, supra note 3, at S12.
43 Portable FM Radio Receivers, 14 C.F.R. § 91.19 (1964). Today, regulations
have expanded to ban portable electronic devices. Portable Electronic Devices,
14 C.F.R. § 91.21 (1995).
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computers and electronic games.44 The company reported in
1985 that portable computers did not appear to threaten air-
craft avionics even when operated in close proximity to the air-
craft's antennae and cabling.4 5 The tests revealed that many
other popular consumer devices-such as AM/FM radio receiv-
ers, walkie talkies, radio control units, electronic games, LEC
and LCD calculators, and electric shavers-do generate emis-
sions that exceed aviation-standard limits.4 6 These items were
then tested in the cockpit of a fixed-based Airbus A310 simula-
tor.47 Although program officials reported no detectable inter-
ference, they did caution that the walkie talkies and radio
control units might pose a risk if they had sufficient power and
were located near sensitive aircraft equipment.48
The RTCA, a non-profit organization that acts as a technical
advisory group for the FAA, the Department of Defense, and
NASA, returned to the issue in 1983.19 Because of limited finan-
cial resources, the study did not include tests of all frequencies
or of damaged devices.5 0  The study concluded that the
probability of interference from PEDs operated on board air-
craft is small and that eight unlikely conditions would have to
occur simultaneously in order for EMI to result.-' Among other
things, the PED would have to be in a "worst-case" position in
the aircraft cabin, be pointed out the window, and be generat-
ing emissions within the aircraft receiver system's operational
frequency band.2 After making a series of assumptions about
the chance of a device being operated in this manner by a pas-
senger seated at the window, and the probability of emissions
strong enough to cause receiver disruption, the RTCA con-
cluded that the chance of EMI during a typical flight is one in
one million, or one incident every two years.5
44 Airbus Finds No Inteference from Electronic Toys, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH.,





49 SPECIAL COMMITrEE 156, supra note 31, at 3.
50 Hunter, supra note 3, at S12.
51 SPECIAL COMMITTEE 156, supra note 31, at 89-90.
52 Id. at 89. In addition, objects outside the aircraft, such as the wing, would
have to create a ricochet effect to maximize the EMI, and the receiver system
would have to be operating at or near its minimum signal level. Id. at 90.
53 Id. at 90-91.
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"Receiver disruption" of the kind measured in the RTCA's
study constitutes EMI but is far less severe than the kind of inci-
dent with which this comment is concerned. The analysis of lia-
bility in this comment is confined to incidents in which
passengers suffer actual physical or emotional harm because the
receiver disruption is severe enough to require sudden evasive
maneuvers or, in the worst case scenario, causes a crash.
Since the RTCA is merely an advisory group, the FAA is free
to adopt some, all, or none of the study's conclusions. 54 In addi-
tion to collecting and analyzing data, the 1988 study made sev-
eral other recommendations. The RTCA noted that the diversity
of PED policies implemented under current FAA guidelines may
have confused some passengers about which devices are safe to
use and when it is safe to use them.5 Thus, the RTCA recom-
mended developing specifications for airlines to use as a guide
for allowing in-flight use of portable electronic devices.5 6 The
recommendation has languished, as has a proposed revision of
the then-controlling FAR section 91.19. 5 7 The revision would
have prohibited use of PEDs during take-offs and landings when
the seat belt sign is on, or whenever directed by a crew mem-
ber. 8 Several airlines have implemented such policies on their
own.
59
An apparent increase in the number of reports of EMI led the
FAA to revisit the topic a few years later. In addition, advances in
aviation technology (such as a shift from metal to composite air-
craft structures, fly-by-wire avionics, and smaller, potentially
more vulnerable, aircraft electronics) coupled with the rapid
growth and constantly changing technology of the consumer
portable electronics industry made the 1988 study obsolete,
prompting the FAA to investigate. 60 The 1992 appropriations
54 Moses, supra note 2.
55 SPECIAL COMMrrTEE 156, supra note 31, at 4.
56 Id. at 23. The RTCA recommended that the specifications meet the follow-
ing three criteria: (1) recognition on the part of PED manufacturers that such
standards are necessary; (2) specifications that reasonably assure that devices
meeting the standard would not interfere with the limits and frequencies of air-
craft systems; and (3) an easily visible indication of compliance with the standard
such as a label or mark on the device. Id. at 23-24.
57 Id. at 96.
58 Id. at 97.
59 See infra notes 96-104 and accompanying text.
60 Bruce D. Nordwall, U.S. Probes EMI Effects of Carry-on Devices, AVIATION WK. &
SPACE TECH., Mar. 8, 1993, at 32-33. The RTCA's 1988 study tested neither com-
posite construction, which has less inherent electromagnetic shielding than
1996] 693
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bill for the Department of Transportation included funding for
an update of the 1988 study.61 The FAA contracted with the
RTCA to conduct the study, which was originally scheduled for
completion in July 1994.62 The study had not been completed as
of January 1996.
In anticipation of the 'RTCA study, PG-Computing magazine
conducted its own tests on a variety of devices. Its study con-
cluded that the potential for EMI does exist and is affected by
the following: (1) the devices' location in the cabin; (2) the
number of devices generating exactly the same frequency that
are in use at the same time; and (3) whether the devices and the
avionics equipment are in proper working order.63 More specif-
ically, PC-Computing's lab study found that the use of many
laptop computers at once does not pose a threat because two
different devices rarely operate on exactly the same frequency.'
In addition, the study described the chance of a passenger's
laptop computer causing navigational interference as "ex-
tremely slight."65 This conclusion is based on a key assumption
that the laptop is in the manufacturer's original condition and
the aircraft's avionics are in proper working order.66 Nintendo
"Gameboys" and Hewlett-Packard calculators appeared safe for
in-flight use, but the study found that intentional radio fre-
quency emitters such as cellular telephones and FM radios do
pose a risk of EMI.67 Cellular phones, for example, produce sig-
nals 60,000 times stronger than those produced by laptop com-
puters.68 When operated as an FM receiver, the Sony Walkman
also produced much stronger emissions than the laptop com-
puters-and at frequencies used by aircraft navigation. 69
metal skin aircraft, nor fly-by-wire technology. SPECIAL COMMITTEE 156, supra
note 31, at 5.
61 DEP'T OF TRANSP. AND RELATED AGENCIES APPROPRIATIONS BILL, S. REP. No.
148, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 80 (1992).
62 The study is comprised of three plases: (1) collection of emissions data for
30 PEDs operated in a screening room (a copper-shielded room free of outside
emissions); (2) measurement of emissions by devices as they operate in the air-
craft; and (3) measurement of effect on avionics in a lab simulation setting.
Moses, supra note 2.









In summary, despite thirty years of intermittent interest in the
topic, the FAA and the airline industry still cannot say with cer-
tainty whether passengers' use of video games, laptop com-
puters, and the like threaten the integrity of aircraft navigation
and communication systems. The available data indicate the
possibility exists, particularly with respect to cellular telephones.
But those who have studied the scientific and anecdotal evi-
dence would likely concede that even passive emitters like CD
and cassette players could cause problems if enough of them
were in use simultaneously or were positioned too close to VOR
receiver antennae.
. None of the studies conducted over the years addressed the
possibility that passengers may be using damaged or even home-
made devices. While airlines carefully monitor the size of carry-
on baggage and the use of seat belts, little attention is paid to
the condition of electronics brought on-board. Electronics man-
ufacturers install shielding to minimize radio noise, but an aver-
age laptop computer loses about half of its shielding within as
little as two years.7" Humidity and poor case design can cause
even faster deterioration. 7'
III. CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW
The federal government's approach to the issue of EMI and
aircraft systems has been fairly conservative. The FAA has specif-
ically allowed a few devices to be brought on board and left it to
the airlines' discretion to permit others. Similarly, the FAA has
sought to maintain a low-key approach to the issue of whether
EMI even exists, perhaps in an effort to avoid unduly alarming
the traveling public.72 Cellular phones, which present a much
more likely hazard than other consumer electronics, may not be
used while airborne.73 Interestingly, the prohibition comes from
70 Corey Sandler, Making the FCC Grade, PC-Computing, Oct. 1993, at 218.
71 Id.
72 The FAA issued an advisory circular in February 1993 warning the public
that portable electronic devices could cause interference but that the probability
is small. FAA, ADVISORY CiRcuLAR 91.21 (Feb. 11, 1993). The FAA seeks to avoid
an arbitrary ban of devices which are safe but prefers to err on the side of safety.
News: Are Consumer Products Interfering with Fight Control? (CNN television broad-
cast, Feb. 18, 1993 (transcript no. 271-2).
73 Public Mobile Services, 47 C.F.R. § 22.925 (1995).
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the FCC, not the FAA, because of concerns that such use would
interfere with the cellular system and users on the ground.74
Meanwhile, the transportation committees of the House and
Senate appear to be at odds over whether it is appropriate to put
the burden on the airlines to test devices and prove that they do
not interfere with aircraft systems, or whether the FAA should
take a more active role. The House appears to support the status
quo and, in its version of the 1994 appropriations bill for the
Department of Transportation, prohibited "the use of funds in
the bill [for] implementing or enforcing regulations relating to
the use of portable electronic devices on aircraft."75 The prohi-
bition was a response to the FAA promulgation of what the
House felt was an "overly restrictive" rule regarding the use of
portable devices, particularly cellular telephones.76
The Senate appears poised to require the FAA to take a more
active role in testing and regulating devices, but only after com-
pletion of the RTCA's latest study.77 The Senate Committee on
Appropriations did not concur with the House's proposed de-
nial of funds for the implementation of the "FAA's rule against
using untested portable electronic devices on an airplane.""
The Committee felt that the "traveling public's safety" might be
compromised if it is left to the airlines to test devices to deter-
mine whether they interfere with aircraft systems 7a and recom-
mended no further action be taken until the RTCA has
completed its investigation."
74 An airborne unit will have a transmitting range much greater than the land-
based unit for which cellular systems are engineered. See 47 C.F.R. § 22.809
(1995).
75 H.R. REP. No. 149, 103d Cong., Ist Sess. 45 (1993).
76 Id. The Committee believed the FAA had provided misleading information
regarding the status of 14 C.F.R. § 91.21 and had adopted provisions more re-
strictive than current research indicates is necessary. Id. Chairman Bob Carr
noted:
This section [14 C.F.R. § 91.21] empowers the airlines to do what
they are doing today. And it is our intent to focus attention that this
section is not up to date, does not contain the best technical advice,
was never intended to be applied to today's situation .... We seek
here to remove that authority to the airlines to do that.
139 CONG. REc. H6878 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 1993) (statement of Rep. Carr). Carr,
a pilot himself, believes the risk of EMI is small. Phillips, supra note 10, at H6.






A. FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION REGULATIONS
The FCC's mission is to "prevent harmful interference to au-
thorized radio communication services. Accordingly, the
FCC has allocated frequencies to specific uses in an effort to
prevent, for example, a CB radio transmission from interfering
with television reception. 2 To further enforce its mandate, the
FCC sets maximum acceptable levels for both intentional and
unintentional electromagnetic emissions and certifies equip-
ment that satisfies the requirements.8 Manufacturers of digital
electronics must obtain FCC certification that the devices do not
exceed maximum emission levels. 84 To meet the requirements,
manufacturers usually minimize radio noise by installing shield-
ing (normally a metallic coating inside the case). However, the
shielding requirements are unrelated to use in aircraft. Rather,
they are designed t6 prevent interference when used in home or
business settings. The FCC did not act on the RTCA's call for a
new, more stringent classification for radio frequency emitters
that would allow the use of such devices during flight.8 5
The only FCC regulation that addresses aviation directly states
that cellular telephones carried aboard airplanes must not be
operated while such aircraft are airborne. When any aircraft
leaves the ground, all cellular telephones on board that aircraft
must be turned off.86 The FCC regulation is motivated by con-
cern that the airborne use of cellular telephones would interfere
with cellular operations.87 The FCC is willing to allow the on-
81 Industrial, Scientific, and Medical Equipment, 47 C.F.R. § 18.101 (1994).
The FCC defines "harmful interference," as it applies to radio frequency devices,
as "[a]ny emission, radiation or induction that endangers the functioning of a
radio navigation service or of other safety services or seriously degrades, obstructs
or repeatedly interrupts a radio communications service." Radio Frequency De-
vices, 47 C.F.R. § 15.3(m)(1994).
82 Frequency Allocations and Radio Treaty Matters, 47 C.F.R. 2.102 (1994).
83 Radio Frequency Devices, 47 C.F.R. § 15.1 (1994); Industrial, Scientific, and
Medical Equipment, 47 C.F.R. § 18.101.
84 Radio Frequency Devices 47, C.F.R. § 15. This section sets out the regula-
tions under which an intentional, unintentional, or incidental radio frequency
device may be operated without an individual license. Id. It also contains the
technical specifications, administrative requirements, and other conditions relat-
ing to the marketing of part 15 devices, including CB radios, televisions, and
personal computers. Id.
85 SPECIAL COMMITrEE 156, supra note 31, at 1.
86 Domestic Public Cellular Radio Telecommunications Service, 47 C.F.R.
§ 22.911(a)(1) (1994).
87 The Use of Cellular Telephones in Aircraft, 57 Fed. Reg. 830 (1992) (to be
codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 22).
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ground use of cellular telephones in aircraft because of the
"public interest benefits" but has deferred to FAA regulations on
the subject.18
Passengers used the permanently installed phones an average
of 50,000 times a day during 1993.89 Given that those phones
are prohibitively expensive for at least some airline passengers,
there probably is pent-up demand for cellular service on air-
craft. The cellular telephone industry is anxious to secure the
right for its customers to use their cellular phones while parked
at the gate or during long delays prior to take-off. In 1991, the
industry commissioned its own study of whether the use of cellu-
lar phones while parked at the gate during passenger loading
and unloading threatens avionics. 90 The study reported that
"comprehensive examination of reports of portable electronic
device interference with aircraft electronic systems [indicates]
that many of these reports are circumstantial and
unsubstantiated. "91
B. FEDERAL AvIATION ADMINISTRATION REGULATIONS
The FAA's involvement in the dispute has been fairly limited.
No statute or regulation requires passenger-operated devices to
be interference-free when used on-board, and the FAA has not
developed technical standards for determining whether devices
are interference-free. 92 Rather than developing detailed regula-
tions for the use of electronic devices on board aircraft, the
agency instead has prohibited the use of any device except port-
able voice recorders, hearing aids, heart pacemakers, and elec-
tric shavers.9  In addition, the regulation authorizes the
operator of the aircraft to use its discretion in allowing the use
of devices "that the operator of the aircraft has determined will
not cause interference with the navigation or communication
system of the aircraft on which it is to be used."94
The agency issued an advisory circular in February 1993 warn-
ing that computers, CD players and the like could cause interfer-
ence but that the probability is small.95 Another advisory
88 Id.
89 Schmit, supra note 18, at lB.
90 Hunter, supra note 3, at S12.
91 Id.
92 SPECIAL COMMITrEE 156, supra note 31, at 4.
93 Portable Electronic Devices, 14 C.F.R. § 91.21 (1995).
94 Id. § 91.21 (b) (5).
95 F.A.A., ADVISORY CIRCULAR 91.21, supra note 72.
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circular effective January 1, 1994 clarified the meaning of FAR
91.21 and recommended that the airlines prohibit the use of
any intentional radiators or transmitters, including CB radios,
cellular phones, and remote control devices.96
The FAA's stance on cellular phones appears to be softening
somewhat since it issued FAR section 91.21, perhaps as a result
of pressure from industry groups and, to a lesser extent, from
the FCC. Since 1991, the FAA has been developing guidelines
for passenger use of their own cellular phones. Government reg-
ulations and airline policies may eventually allow passengers to
use their own phones when the plane is at the gate or during
extended ground delays when the captain has specifically au-
thorized use.97
C. INDIVIDUAL AIRLINE POLICIES
As noted previously, the airlines have developed their own ap-
proaches to EMI over the past several yeitrs and their policies
continue to evolve. Though there is no industry standard, air-
line policies are fairly similar. American Airlines' approach is
typical. The airline has divided devices into two categories: those
that are prohibited at all times and those permitted for use only
after the aircraft reaches an altitude of 10,000 feet.98 Devices in
the first category are AM/FM or VHF radios, TV sets, TV cam-
eras, cellular telephones, electronic toys or games with remote
control, and cordless computer mouses. 99 Devices in the second
category are voice recorders, CD and tape cassette players, elec-
tric shavers, camcorders and video recorders, electronic games
or toys without remote controls, computers, calculators, elec-
tronic typewriters with attached mouses, and global positioning
system receivers. 100
96 An intentional radiator is "a device that intentionally generates and emits
radio frequency (R/F) energy by radiation or induction. Radio Frequency De-
vices, 47 C.F.R § 15.3(o) (1994). Incidental radiators are devices that generate
RF energy when used although the device is not intentionally designed to gener-
ate or emit RF energy such as mechanical light switches. Id. § 15.3(n). Uninten-
tional radiators are devices that intentionally generate RF energy for use within
the device, or that send RF signals by conduction to associated equipment via
connecting wiring, but which are not intended to emit RF energy by radiation or
induction. Id. § 15.3(z).
97 The Use of Cellular Telephones in Aircraft, 57 Fed. Reg. 830.
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. Since mid-1993, United Airlines has banned the use of porta-
ble electronic devices when a plane is below 10,000 feet.10'
When they announced the new policy, airline officials were
quick to point out that they had "not experienced any safety
problems with these devices" and that the measure was purely
precautionary.1 0 2 Northwest Airlines implemented a similar pol-
icy in March 1993.103 As mentioned previously, Malaysia is con-
sidering prohibiting passengers from even taking these devices
on-board. 0 4
All major carriers impose restrictions on the use of electronic
devices during takeoffs and landings, but there are no guide-
lines on how to implement the restrictions. Northwest Airlines
wants to use an indicator light to notify passengers when the
plane is below 10,000 feet so they can stop using the devices.'05
Delta wants to allow use as soon as the plane is off the ground
while American would prohibit use when the seatbelt sign is
illuminated.10 6
IV. AIRLINE LIABILITY FOR ELECTROMAGNETIC
INTERFERENCE
This section begins with a brief description of the standard of
care imposed on airlines and a note on the current preemption
controversy. Since the issue of EMI and PEDs has never been
litigated, the third part of this section examines how the courts
have handled airline liability in analogous situations. For exam-
ple, those situations in which it is a passenger's activity, rather
than an external force such as weather, mechanical failure, or
pilot error, that endangers passengers. These situations primar-
ily include mishaps involving baggage handling and seat belts,
the most common causes of passenger injury short of a crash. 0 7
101 United to Prohibit Use of Portable Electronic Equipment Below 10,000 Feet, supra
note 16, at 463.
102 Id.
103 Id.
104 Malaysia Mulls Tough New Rules on Portable Electronic Devices, supra note 39, at
3. At present, the airline bans on-board use of six PEDs: cellul r phones, pagers,
CD players, remote control devices for toys, CB radios, and amateur radio trans-
mitters. Id.
105 Phillips, supra note 10, at H6.
106 Id. at Hi.
107 For example, in 1987, United Airlines received 135 reports of items falling
from the overhead bins. Andrews v. United Airlines, Inc., 24 F.3d 39, 40 (9th Cir.
1994). As a result, the airline added a standard arrival announcement warning
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This section also briefly discusses claims of injury caused by ex-
posure to passengers' tobacco smoke.
A. NOTE ON THE STANDARD OF CARE
It is well settled that the special relationship between a com-
mon carrier, 10 8 such as an airline, and its passengers imposes a
duty on the airline to use the utmost care and diligence in pro-
tecting its passengers from harm.10 9 An airline is "responsible
for any, even the slightest, negligence and [is] required to do all
that human care, vigilance, and foresight reasonably can do
under all the circumstances."'"0 Proof of injury to a fare-paying
passenger on a common carrier and failure to safely reach the
passenger's destination establishes a prima facie case of negli-
gence."' The common carrier then has the burden of showing
that the incident did not occur, that it was not negligent, or that
any negligence on its part was not the legal cause of the plain-
tiff's injury." 2
The airline's duty is broad but not without boundaries. An
airline does not insure the safety of its passengers.113 Rather it
"must exercise the highest degree of care consistent with the
practical operation of its plane for the safety of the passen-
gers."" 4 Common carriers have been found liable for failure to
act when one passenger intentionally harms another.1 5 Com-
mon carriers generally are not liable for harm resulting from
the passengers that items stored in the overhead bins may have shifted during
flight. Id.
108 A common carrier "holds itself out to the public as willing to carry all pas-
sengers for hire indiscriminately... either by advertising or by actually engaging
in the business of carriage for hire." Arrow Aviation, Inc. v. Moore, 266 F.2d 488,
490 (8th Cir. 1959).
109 Lopez v. Southern Cal. Rapid Transit Dist., 710 P.2d 907, 915 (Cal. 1985);
see also Moore, 266 F.2d at 491.
110 Acosta v. Southern Cal. Rapid Transit Dist., 465 P.2d 72, 77 (Cal. 1970).
III Schwamb v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 516 So. 2d 452, 461 (La. Ct. App. 1987).
112 Id.
I's Lopez, 710 P.2d at 909.
114 Arrow Aviation, 266 F.2d at 491.
115 See, e.g., Lopez, 710 P.2d at 912-14 (bus company and driver have duty to do
more than stand by while one passenger assaults another). See also Ricci v. Ameri-
can Airlines, 544 A.2d 428, 431 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1988) (airline liable
where it failed to protect against a foreseeable "flareup between a militant non-
smoker and an intransigent smoker in [a] situation [the airline] created").
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
passengers' negligence" 6 unless there is evidence that the car-
rier failed to guard against such foreseeable negligence.1 1 7
B. NOTE ON PREEMPTION ISSUES" 8
A major controversy is brewing over whether Congress has
preempted all state common law tort causes of action for wrong-
ful air carrier conduct. Simply put, the dispute is about the via-
bility of the saving clause 9 of the Federal Aviation Act of
1958,120 the scope of the preemption provision of the Airline
116 See Harrison v. Northwest Orient Airlines, Inc., 677 F. Supp. 131, 132, 134
(S.D.N.Y. 1987) (applying New York law airline not liable for injuries suffered
when one passenger tripped over another's bag where passenger, not a crew
member, put the bag there). Contra Garrett v. American Airlines, Inc., 332 F.2d
939, 942 (5th Cir. 1964) (applying Texas law when holding carrier must take
reasonably appropriate steps to minimize likely harm from fellow passengers).
117 Brosnahan v. Western Air Lines, Inc., 892 F.2d 730, 733-34 (8th Cir. 1989)
(holding that allegations of airline crew's inadequate supervision of passengers'
stowing of luggage in overhead bins is a question for the jury); Rodriguez v. New
Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc., 400 So. 2d 884, 887-88 (La. 1981) (holding that in a
street car accident where one passenger negligently injures another, with respect
to a hazard associated with the transportation of passengers, the carrier breaches
its duty of care if it or its employees fail to take practicable action to prevent
reasonably foreseeable injuries).
118 Detailed analysis of the issue is beyond the scope of this Comment,
however, several articles have been written on this topic. For detailed treatment,
please reference Stuart J. Starry, Federal Preemption in Commercial Aviation: Tort
Litigation Under 49 U.S.C. § 1305, 58 J. AIR L. & COM. 657 (1993); Lance M.
Harvey, Note, Cleveland v. Piper Aircraft Corp.: The Tenth Circuit Holds that the
Federal Aviation Act of 1958 Does Not Preempt State Common Law Claims for Negligent
Design, 46 BAYLOR L. REv. 485 (1994); Eric W. Maclure, Morales v. Trans World
Airlines, Inc.: Federal Preemption Provision Clips States'Wings on Regulation of AirFare
Advertising, 71 N.C. L. REv. 905 (1993); Shari L. Pitko, Comment, Aviation Law:
Preemption of State Law Tort Claims by the Federal Aviation Act-Do State Law Tort
Claims Survive the Attack?, 33 WASHBURN LJ. 234 (1993).
119 A savings clause is defined as a "restriction in a repealing act, which is in-
tended to save rights, pending proceedings, penalties, etc., from the annihilation
which would result from an unrestricted repeal." BLACK'S Law DIcTIoNARY 1343
(6th ed. 1990).
120 Pub. L. No. 85-726, 72 Stat. 731 (1958) (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C.
app. § 1301) (1988 & Supp. V 1993), repealed in part by Pub. L. No. 103-272, 108
Stat. 745 (1994). "Nothing contained in this chapter shall in any way abridge or
alter remedies now existing at common law or by statute, but the provisions of
this chapter are in addition to such remedies." 49 U.S.C. app. § 1506 (1988),
repealed y Pub. L. No. 103-272, 108 Stat. 745 (1994) (replaced in substance by 49
U.S.C. § 40,120(c) (1994)).
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Deregulation Act of 1978,121 and the interpretation of "services"
as that term is used in the deregulation legislation. 12 2
The 1978 Act removed federal regulation of airline industry
economics and included a preemption provision which Con-
gress intended would prevent states from essentially undoing
the deregulation achieved by the Act.123 Airlines regularly raise
a preemption defense to defeat claims of negligence, 24 breach
of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, 25 and other state
law claims.' 26 They contend that such lawsuits have a regulatory
effect on airline conduct. Some courts have accepted the air-
lines' arguments and have interpreted federal law to preempt all
state common law claims relating to rates, routes, or services.12 7
Along with this reading of the statute has come a broad inter-
pretation of "services" to include almost anything an airline
does.1 28 Other courts have held that federal law neither ex-
121 Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (1978) (codified primarily at 49 U.S.C.
app. §§ 1301-89, repealed in part by Pub. L. No. 103-272, 108 Stat. 745 (1994)).
122 The statute provided that "no [s] tate or political subdivision thereof...
shall enact or enforce any law, rule, regulation, standard, or other provision hav-
ing the force and effect of law relating to rates, routes, or services of any air
carrier having... to provide air transportation." 49 U.S.C. § 1305 (1988), repealed
by Pub. L. No. 103-272, 108 Stat. 745 (1994) (replaced in substance by 49 U.S.C.
§ 41,713(b) (1) (1994)).
123 Starry, supra note 118, at 660.
124 See, e.g., Hodges v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 44 F.3d 334, 335 (5th Cir. 1995) (en
banc) (employing a summary judgment to dismiss a negligence claim invovling
an overhead compartment); Margolis v. United Airlines, Inc., 811 F. Supp. 318,
319 (E.D. Mich. 1993) (failing to win on a motion to dismiss a claim arising when
items fell from the overhead bins).
125 West v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 923 F.2d 657 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. granted
and judgment vacated, 504 U.S. 968 (1992), and superseded by, 995 F.2d 148 (9th
Cir. 1993). West was vacated in light of Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504
U.S. 374 (1992). The plaintiff in West sued for breach of the covenant of good
faith and fair dealing after the airline denied him a seat on an overbooked flight
for which he had purchased a ticket.
126 See, e.g., O'Carroll v. American Airlines, Inc., 863 F.2d 11 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 490 U.S. 1106 (1989) (holding that federal law preempts state law claim of
wrongful exclusion); Salley v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 723 F. Supp. 1164 (E.D.
La. 1989) (applying Louisiana law to an alleged wrongful exclusion from flight).
127 Morales, 504 U.S. at 375 (preemption of claims under Deceptive Trade Prac-
tices Act); O'Carroll 863 F.2d at 13 (discussing preemption of state common law
claims arising out of allegedly wrongful exclusion from a flight).
128 Stewart v. American Airlines, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 1194, 1197 (S.D. Tex. 1991)
("those cases which have held that a [p]laintiffs claims were . . . [related] to
'services' and therefore pre-empted... all involved services provided by individ-
ual airline employees directly to passengers, such as ticketing, boarding, in-flight
service, and the like").
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pressly nor impliedly preempts common law claims.'2 9 For the
purposes of this Comment, the author assumes that the latter
view will prevail and that federal law does not preempt state
common law claim for injuries resulting from passengers' on-
board use of personal electronic devices.
C. AIRLINE LIABILITY FOR INJURIES CAUSED BY
ELECTROMAGNETIC INTERFERENCE
When passengers use portable electronic devices, they expose
everyone on the plane to risk, assuming that electromagnetic
interference (EMI) is a real threat which appears to be the case
with cellular phones. This section will extend the analysis of bag-
gage, seat belt, and smoking injuries to PEDs and EMI and ex-
amine an airline's liability for injuries sustained in three
scenarios: (1) one or more passengers negligently fail to follow
the airline's policy on the use of PEDs, (2) the airline's policy is
inadequate and allows the use of PEDs that interfere with air-
craft systems, and (3) flight attendants instruct passengers to
stop using their PEDs but fail to ensure that the passengers
comply.
1. Where the Passengers Negligently Fail to Follow the Airline's
Policy
From the moment passengers enter the airport terminal, they
are subject to a wide variety of regulations governing their con-
duct.3 0 They cannot smoke, and jokes about guns at the security
check may result in a baggage search.13 1 Once on the plane, pas-
sengers must remain seated during take-offs and landings and
any other time the captain deems it necessary.13 2 Before take-off,
the flight attendants make the standard safety presentation, cov-
ering everything from how to fasten a seat belt to how to use the
12 Cleveland v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 985 F.2d 1438, 1444-45 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 114 S. Ct. 291 (1993) (holding that no preemption of claim of negligent
aircraft design where design met all FAA standards); Ravreby v. United Airlines,
Inc., 293 N.W.2d 260, 263 (Iowa 1980) (no preemption of claim for harm and
discomfort suffered as a result of smoking by fellow passengers); Kiefer v. Conti-
nental Airlines, Inc., 882 S.W.2d 496, 503 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1994,
writ granted) (no preemption of state laws merely having an effect on airline
services, e.g., of a duty of good faith and fair dealing imposed on all persons
entering into contracts).





seat cushion as a flotation device."' 3 A survey of the passengers
during this routine reveals that few passengers actually listen.134
Most have already heard this information. Besides, passengers
believe that the chances of a plane crash are minimal. Perhaps it
is not surprising that this nonchalant attitude often extends to
the use of portable electronic devices. In their defense, passen-
gers may not be disobeying the rules intentionally. Airlines have
different PED policies and they implement them in different
ways.1 3 5 Confusion about when and what devices are acceptable
is understandable. In addition, passengers simply may not real-
ize that many airlines have added restrictions on portable elec-
tronic devices to their standard safety speech.
The standard safety announcement also includes warnings
about the danger of falling luggage. One passenger's careless-
ness in storing or retrieving luggage in the overhead compart-
ment is a common cause of harm to other passengers. In the
typical scenario, passengers who are anxious to avoid delays at
the baggage carousel bring luggage onto the plane and store it
in the overhead bins. As the plane fills up with passengers, over-
head and uncer-seat space becomes scarcer. The flight attend-
ant then comes along to help passengers stow every last
briefcase, suitcase, and garment bag in the remaining space.
The trip proceeds uneventfully until the plane arrives at the gate
and passengers and flight attendants begin retrieving luggage
from the overhead bins. The unfortunate person sitting in the
aisle or center seat may then be injured by falling luggage. The
injured passenger may sue not only the person who dropped the
luggage, but the airline as well.
In the above scenario, courts naturally have examined the
flight attendants' role in the chain of events. Did a flight attend-
ant stow or retrieve the luggage? Did the flight attendant super-
vise the passengers', stowing and retrieval of baggage? Was the
"Fasten Seat Belt" sign on when the passenger removed or
stored the luggage? If so, did the attendant warn the offending
passenger to remain seated? What other safety announcements
did the flight crew make regarding the overhead bins?
133 Id.
134 For example, when asked if she had heard the flight attendant's warning to
use care in removing items from the overhead bin, one passenger stated, "I really
wasn't paying any attention to what they were saying about the overheads ....
They may have said it. They may have not. I really don't remember." Bravis v.
Dunbar, 449 S.E.2d 495, 497 n.4 (S.C. Ct. App. 1994) (ellipsis in original).
135 See supra notes 98-103 and accompanying text.
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In cases where a passenger both stores and removes the lug-
gage from the bin, the airline may avoid liability by making the
standard safety announcements. These announcements include
warning passengers to remain seated until the plane is at the
gate, reminding passengers that luggage in the bins may have
shifted during flight, and advising the passengers to take caution
when opening the bins. The airline may successfully avoid liabil-
ity by making such warnings and by quickly stopping passengers
who ignore the "Fasten Seat Belt" sign and begin to remove
their bags while the plane is still taxiing to the gate.
Rodriguez Pardo v. Delta Airlines, Inc.13 6 is typical in its handling
of a passenger's claim of injury caused by another passenger's
negligence. In Rodriguez Pardo, the plaintiff was injured when a
camera case fell on her as another passenger removed it from
the bin. The pilot had instructed all passengers to remain
seated by illuminating the seat belt sign, and there was no evi-
dence that the flight attendant had enough time to warn the
offending passenger to sit down before the incident occurred.
The court granted summary judgment for the airline because
the plaintiff had "completely fail [ed] to establish any negligence
of the defendant."13 7
Similarly, in Haley v. United Airlines, Inc.,3 s the plaintiff was
injured when another passenger, Ronald Weems, .opened the
overhead compartment and dropped a briefcase on her head.
The court granted summary judgment for the airline because its
employees had warned passengers to remain seated until the
plane had arrived at the gate. 3 9 Moreoever, flight attendants
immediately attempted to intercept Weems when he got out of
his seat while the plane was still taxiing.
Even in cases where a passenger stores and removes the lug-
gage but does not violate airline policies, such as retrieving lug-
gage while the seat belt light is on, the airline may not be
relieved of liability. A court may still find an airline negligent for
failure to supervise the boarding process or for failing to do
more than simply warn passengers about the possibility of shift-
ing baggage.
186 767 F. Supp. 26 (D.P.R. 1991).
137 Id. at 29.
158 728 F. Supp. 374 (D. Md. 1989).
1s9 Id. at 376-77.
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In Brosnahan v. Western Air Lines, Inc.,14 0 a fellow passenger in-
jured the plaintiff when he dropped his carry-on bag on the
plaintiff's head while struggling to stow the bag in the overhead
compartment. The plaintiff established at trial that a flight at-
tendant should have been, but was not, at the "bulkhead" to as-
sist passengers with carry-on luggage.1 4 1 The Eighth Circuit held
that "[a]n airline's duty to supervise the boarding process for
the protection of its passengers continues until boarding is com-
pleted, and the danger created by an airline's breach of that
duty does not abate until all passengers are seated with their
carry-on luggage properly stowed." 142 The appellate court or-
dered the district court to reinstate the jury's verdict for the
plaintiff, holding that a jury could reasonably conclude that the
harm was both a foreseeable and probable consequence of the
attendants' failure to supervise the passengers as they stowed
their luggage in the bins.143 Given that one of the reasons flight
attendants are stationed throughout the cabin is to protect the
safety of the passengers, the flight attendants' absence in the
bulkhead could be a "substantial factor" in causing the plaintiff's
injuries. 1 "
Failure to specifically warn the passengers about the risk of
falling luggage will very likely lead to defeat for the airline. In
Schwamb v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.,'4 5 flight attendants directed the
passengers to ensure that all items were stowed either above or
below the seats and to call for assistance in stowing their luggage
if necessary. The jury found that the announcement did not
adequately guard against passengers' foreseeable negligence in
stowing and removing items.'4 The appellate court upheld the
finding of Delta's sole liability and awarded the plaintiff
$885,000 in damages. 147
140 892 F.2d 730 (8th Cir. 1989).
141 Id. at 732 (the bulkhead is the wall dividing the first class cabin from the
coach cabin).
142 Id. at 733.
143 Id. at 734.
144 Id.
45 516 So. 2d 452 (La. Ct. App. 1987) (describing the cause of plaintiffs injury
as a fMlling briefcase from an overhead bin).
146 Id. at 462-63 (describing Delta policies which did not require flight attend-
ants to check inside the bins or open those that were already closed and not
requiring crew members to redistribute the luggage if the passengers had over-
stuffed or improperly loaded a bin). I-
147 Id. at 468. The final award represented a $100,000 decrease in the general
damages that the jury had awarded. Id.
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In Andrews v. United Airlines, Inc.,148 the court acknowledged
that the facts were unclear concerning who had stored the fall-
ing briefcase, what caused it to fall, or who had opened the
bin.1 49 The plaintiffs only claim was that her injury was foresee-
able and the airline did not prevent it.150 United Airlines fol-
lows standard industry practice and warns its passengers to be
cautious when opening the overhead bins at the end of the
flight.1 51 Instead of relieving the airline of liability, the standard
warning was evidence that objects falling out of overhead bins
endanger the passengers, and the defendant was aware of the
danger.1 2 The court deemed summary judgment inappropriate
because ajury could have reasonably concluded that United Air-
lines had a duty to do more than warn passengers about the
possibility of falling baggage.155
The Brosnahan Court's broad formulation of an airline's duty
to supervise its passengers' activities and the Andrews and
Schwamb courts' reluctance to rely on standard industry prac-
tice as evidence of the appropriate standard of care appear
likely to lead to a finding of airline liability in most of these bag-
gage cases. As will be discussed later, the flight attendants' direct
involvement in stowing or retrieving the baggage may lead to
airline liability. Under the Andrews and Brosnahan analyses, the
flight attendants' lack of involvement in the process leads to the
same result, despite the intervening negligence of a third party
(the passenger retrieving or stowing the luggage). Foreseeability
is the key to the analysis. Flight attendants are aware of the haz-
ard,15 4 and many major airlines have been involved in litigation
resulting from such incidents. As the Andrews court noted, even
148 24 F.3d 39 (9th Cir. 1994).
149 Id. at 40.
150 Id.
151 Id. at 40-41.
152 Id. at 41.
153 Id. at 42. The plaintiff argued that the airline could have reduced the risk of
falling luggage by retro-fitting overhead bins with netting. Id. at 41. The Schwamb
court noted several readily available steps to minimize the risk of injuries caused
by falling luggage: pre-boarding instructions about how to load the bins; pre-
boarding inspection of the weight and volume of all carry-on baggage; announce-
ments before landing and while taxiing concerning the removal of luggage; and,
safety cards with illustrations of proper loading techniques. Schwamb, 516 So. 2d
at 463.
154 See, e.g. id. at 462-463 (indicating flight attendants were aware that passen-
gers sometimes overstuff the overhead bins, had witnessed or heard about inci-
dents of falling luggage, and had read company publications reporting an
increase in the number of such incidents).
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an event that is statistically insignificant may still be considered
foreseeable for the purposes of determining liability. 155 As part
of its defense, United Airlines pointed out that the 135 reports
of falling baggage included incidents in which no one was in-
jured and were spread over millions of passengers traveling on
its 175,000 flights every year.1
56
The results in Andrews and Brosnahan do not bode well for an
airline defending itself from an EMI claim. First, the standard of
care would almost certainly include a duty to limit the passen-
gers' use of PEDs during take-offs and landings. The major air-
lines have already implemented such policies so one could
argue that it is standard industry practice. Andrews indicates that
industry practice sets the minimum, not the maximum, safety
level. Second, the involvement of the flight attendants in moni-
toring the boarding process and informing the passengers about
safety precautions increases the crew's presumed awareness of
the passengers' activities. Third, passengers' confusion about in-
flight use of PEDs and passenger tendency to ignore standard
safety warnings create an environment in which use of PEDs in
violation of airline policy is reasonably foreseeable. Thus, the
crew's failure to ensure that all passengers have stopped using
their portable electronic devices during take-off and landing
would breach the standard of care.
Of course, the plaintiff must also show that the airline's negli-
gence in monitoring the passengers' use of PEDs proximately
caused the plaintiff's injuries by interfering with the aircraft sys-
tems. This causation requirement could be very difficult to
show. Assuming there was actual physical harm, because of a
crash or sudden change in altitude, the plaintiff would probably
need direct evidence, such as eyewitness accounts, to establish
that one or more passengers used PEDs during the flight. The
next step would be the presentation of persuasive scientific data
indicating that a PED in use on the flight caused the EMI, which
in turn caused the crash or other harmful incident.
The airline could attack the lengthy chain of causation at sev-
eral points. At the threshold, the airline might argue that the
airline is not liable for the negligence of a third party.15 7 For
I55 Andrews, 24 F.3d at 41.
156 Id.
157 See, e.g., Baker v. Delta Airlines, Inc., No. 03A01-9312-CV-00431, 1994 WL
283858 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 28, 1994) (falling luggage case in which the defend-
ant argued the proximate cause of the accident and the plaintiffs injuries was the
negligent act or omission of someone for whom the airline was not responsible).
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example, airlines are not negligent solely because they allow lug-
gage to be stored overhead.'15 Extending this logic to PEDs,
one might argue that airlines are not negligent simply because
they allow passengers to bring CD players, computers, and other
portable electronic devices onto the plane. Such an argument
seems likely to fail, however, even under a Rodriguez Pardo or
Haley analysis. Those cases indicate that flight attendants must
stop passengers from flouting safety precautions when they be-
come aware of the passengers' misconduct. 159 Neither case indi-
cates any lessening of the crew's duty to supervise the
passengers' activities during the flight. 60 The defendants. pre-
vailed primarily because the flight attendant attempted to stop
the offending passenger where there was time to do so. In an
EMI case, an attack on the scientific data and anecdotal evi-
dence, which are far from conclusive, is probably the better
strategy for the airlines.
2. Were the Airline's Policy is Inadequate
Current airline policies allowing in-flight use of PEDs assume
that all of the devices brought on board are in good condition
and emit radio waves at standard levels. The policies also assume
that the risk of EMI is limited to take-offs and landings. Airline
policies do not adequately address passengers' use of damaged
or home-made devices or other devices that emit unusually high
levels of radio emissions. The flight crew has little time to in-
spect the devices and no way to screen their emissions levels.
Further, the existing scientific data only relates to devices that
are in proper working order. Harmful EMI could result, despite
passengers' full compliance with airline policies.
The seat belt and smoking cases are illustrative. 16 1 In the seat
belt cases, passengers sue the airline after being injured during
turbulence while the "Fasten Seat Belt" sign is off. FAA regula-
tions allow the pilot to use discretion as to when the sign may
158 Haley v. United Airlines, Inc., 728 F. Supp. 374 (D. Md. 1989) (passenger
was on notice of articles stored in the bins).
159 Haley, 728 F. Supp. at 376; Rodriguez Pardo, 767 F. Supp. at 28.
160 Id.; Haley, 728 F. Supp. at 376.
161 The case law which discusses smoking on airplanes may have reached its
full development now that passengers may not smoke on any commercial domes-
tic airline flight. Delta Air Lines became the first major airline to ban smoking on
all flights, domestic and international. Delta in Line to Be First to Ban Smoking on All
of Its Flights, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 15, 1994, at D2.
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safely be turned off.162 The smoking cases arise when non-smok-
ers are injured by exposure to other passengers' tobacco smoke.
In both scenarios the airline and the passenger comply with FAA
regulations, but the airline may still be found liable for in-flight
injuries.
In seat belt cases, numerous courts have held the airline liable
for the pilot's failure to illuminate the seat belt light under cir-
cumstances where the pilot knew or should have known that the
flight might encounter dangerous turbulence.163 This is particu-
larly true when flying in bad weather. 164 Once the flight en-
counters turbulence, the crew's responsibility to ensure that
passengers comply with the seat belt policies becomes even
greater. 65 Illuminating the seat belt sign is critical, and flight
attendants must immediately warn passengers who ignore the
warning to return to their seats. 166
Instances of injuries sustained during "clear air turbulence"
are less straightforward. Older cases indicate that the advanced
meteorological equipment available to pilots and air traffic con-
trollers increases their duty to predict turbulent conditions even
in good weather.1 67 The pilot will be charged with knowledge of
geographical hazards, such as irregular terrain with deep cany-
ons and high mountain peaks,1 68 and changing weather pat-
terns, such as a low pressure area or an advancing cold front
which increase the chances of violent "clear air turbulence. '1 69
Airlines have achieved a higher success rate in more recent
litigation involving sudden clear air turbulence. 170 Defendants
162 Passenger Information, 14 C.F.R. § 121.317 (1995).
163 Brittain v. Piedmont Aviation, Inc., 120 S.E.2d 72, 73 (N.C. 1961)(injury
occurred in an area where defendant knew downdrafts were apt to occur); Small
v. Transcontinental & W. Air, Inc., 216 P.2d 36, 37 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1950)
(injury occurred during a sudden downdraft when the seat belt sign was off); cf.
Urban v. Frontier Air Lines, Inc., 139 F. Supp. 288 (D. Wyo. 1956) (flight attend-
ant authorized plaintiff to leave seat shortly after the plane experienced turbu-
lence); Ness v. West Coast Airlines, Inc., 410 P.2d 965, 968 (Idaho 1965) (plaintiff
thrown from seat due to sudden turbulence, despite loosely fastened seat belt).
164 Smal, 216 P.2d at 36; cf. Urban, 139 F. Supp. at 288.
165 Urban, 139 F. Supp. at 290.
166 Haley, 728 F. Supp. at 376.
167 Ness, 410 P.2d at 967; Brittain, 120 S.E.2d at 75.
168 Id. at 74.
169 Ness, 410 P.2d at 967-68.
170 Karuba v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., No. 87 Civ. 1455, 1991 WL 51093, at *3
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 3, 1991) (summary judgment for defendant where pilot had
turned off the "Fasten Seat Belt" sign and where plaintiff fell during clear air
turbulence which "cannot be anticipated or avoided"); Kelly v. American Airlines,
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have successfully argued that the very suddenness of such turbu-
lence made it impossible or impracticable to prevent all injuries.
This success seems at odds with the standard of foreseeability
that courts apply in the overhead bin cases.17 1 Encountering
turbulence would seem to be at least as reasonably foreseeable
as an item falling from the overhead bin and, as previously dis-
cussed, even statistically improbable events can still be consid-
ered foreseeable.1 72 Yet, in recent clear air turbulence cases,
plaintiffs who suffered injuries after the pilot had turned off the
seat belt sign did not prevail. The dichotomy is striking given
that in both the falling luggage and turbulence scenarios, one
could argue that an inadequate policy led to the passenger's in-
jury. For example, a jury might reasonably conclude that since
clear air turbulence is difficult to predict and can cause serious
injuries, the pilot should keep the seat belt sign illuminated at
all times. Passengers would then have to obtain permission from
the flight attendant to make a trip to the lavatory or get some-
thing out of the overhead bin. The burden of such a policy
might well outweigh its benefits. Passengers might feel like pris-
oners, and the flight attendants might spend an inordinate
amount of time on each flight responding to ringing call but-
tons. In any event, courts and juries have found that standard
industry practice 1 7 and the pilot's discretion in turning on the
seat belt sign adequately safeguard against clear air turbulence
mishaps.
If a flight attendant authorizes a passenger to leave her seat
during a momentary calm, the airline may be liable for ensuing
injuries. 174 This scenario is analogous to a flight attendant's
grant of a passenger's request to use a PED after the navigation
systems have exhibited signs of EMI problems. Thus, communi-
cation between the pilot and the flight attendants is critical. The
Inc., 372 F. Supp. 1214, 1216 (N.D. Tex. 1974) (court rejected plaintiff's res ipsa
loquitur argument); Kohler v. Aspen Airways, Inc., 214 Cal. Rptr. 720, 726 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1985) (holding there is no duty to warn passenger of possible air turbu-
lence, absent any evidence that a reasonably prudent person would have refused
to take the flight as a result); Powell v. Dell-Air Aviation, Inc., 74 Cal. Rptr. 3 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1968); Sanchez v. American Airlines, Inc., 436 N.Y.S.2d 824 (N.Y. Civ. Ct.
1981).
171 See supra notes 126-50 and accompanying text.
172 Andrews, 24 F.3d at 41.
173 The standard safety announcement typically includes a suggestion that pas-
sengers leave their seat belts fastened even after the pilot has turned off the
"Fasten Seat Belt" sign. See AMERICAN AIRLINES, FLIGHT MANuAL (1994).
174 Urban, 139 F. Supp. at 290.
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pilot should be aware that PEDs may affect navigation and com-
munication systems. If the pilot notices irregularities in the sys-
tems' performance, he should ask the flight attendants to
ascertain the number and kind of devices in use in the flight
cabin and then instruct the passengers to turn off their PEDs.175
In Powell v. Dell-Air Aviation, Inc.,176 the plaintiffs loosely fast-
ened seat belt provided little protection from unexpected turbu-
lence that catapulted her out of her seat. The court noted that,
as is customary, the flight attendant had visually checked to' see
if passengers had fastened their belts.1 77 The flight attendant,
however, did not "yank" on the belt to see how tightly it was
fastened. 7 The jury found that the visual inspection satisfied
the airline's duty of utmost care.1 79 The result in Powell may
have turned on the fact that the pilot had illuminated the
"Fasten Seat Belt" sign. In the early seat belt cases noted above
(those litigated between 1950 and 1965), the pilot had turned
off the sign.
Extending Powell's analysis to PEDs and EMI, one might con-
clude that the flight crew would not be expected to evaluate
whether a device is home-made, damaged, or generating unusu-
ally high emissions. Rather, checking to ensure that all devices
were turned off during take-off and landing would satisfy the
duty of utmost care. A visual check may be inadequate because
as the RTCA's 1988 study noted, not all PEDs have "obvious
means of ensuring that the device is actually turned off."i 18  The
comparison is further strained by the fact that a loosely fastened
seat belt would generally endanger only one person, whereas a
malfunctioning PED would endanger the entire aircraft. It
seems reasonable to assume, however, that the airline's duty to
safely transport one passenger is no different from its duty to
safely carry all of the passengers.
Once the plaintiff has cleared the causation hurdle and
shown that another passenger's PED interfered with the avionics
which resulted in some harmful event, the law will impute a
175 The RTCA further advises the flight crew to: (1) confirm that the suspected
device is causing interference by turning it on and off several times; (2) note the
aircraft system and the radio frequency experiencing interference; and (3) note
the severity of the interference. SPECIAL COMMITrEE 156, supra note 31, at 98.
176 74 Cal. Rptr. 3 (Cal. Ct. App. 1968).
177 Id. at 5.
178 Id.
179 Id. at 6.
180 SPECIAL COMMITTEE 156, supra note 31, at 4.
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great deal of knowledge to the airline. An airline probably
would be assumed to know that PEDs emit varying levels of radio
waves and that some are hazardous even when the plane is at
cruising altitude.
In Ravreby v. United Airlines, Inc.""1 the plaintiff, a non-smoking
passenger seated one row in front of the smoking section, sued
for damages caused by exposure to another passenger's tobacco
smoke. In applying the standard of care, the court used a two-
part analysis: (1) whether a reasonable fact finder could con-
clude that United Airlines could reasonably have anticipated the
danger that a non-smoker would become ill; and (2) whether a
reasonable fact finder could conclude that United's policy
guarded against the danger. 8 2
The court quickly concluded that United Airlines could have
reasonably anticipated that non-smokers would be irritated or
injured by exposure to second-hand tobacco smoke. 83 Airlines
must take reasonable notice of the habits of their passengers,
and should expect some of its passengers to smoke, if airline
regulations permit it.'8 4 Further, it is common knowledge that
many non-smokers find tobacco smoke highly bothersome,
which led the CAB to adopt regulations segregating smoking
and non-smoking seats.'8 5 As previously discussed, on-board use
of PEDs is common and could be considered a "habit" under
this analysis.
The second prong of Ravreby's two-prong test required a more
detailed treatment. In evaluating the airline's policy, the court
balanced (1) the remoteness of the danger to the plaintiff; (2)
the airline's duty to preserve the comfort of all its passengers;
and (3) the discretion inherent in the federal regulations gov-
erning designation of non-smoking seats. 18 6 First, the court con-
cluded that the air circulation in aircraft cabins minimizes the
risk of exposure to secondhand smoke in the non-smoking sec-
tion, 87 thus making the irritation of non-smokers a remote dan-
ger. Second, the alternative to banning smoking entirely would
subject smoking passengers to "severe discomfort."' 88 The air-
181 293 N.W.2d 260 (Iowa 1980).
182 Id. at 264.
183 Id.
184 Id.
185 Id. (citing 38 Fed. Reg. 12209 (1973)).
186 Ravreby, 293 N.W.2d at 265.
187 Id.
188 Id. (quoting 38 Fed. Reg. 12209 (1973)).
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line's designation of smoking and non-smoking seats was a rea-
sonable compromise to preserve the comfort of all
passengers.189 Third, United Airlines used proper discretion
and fully complied with the CAB regulations intending to give
airlines flexibility in designating the smoking section. 190 After
evaluating all three factors, the court concluded that United
had not breached its duty of care to Dr. Ravreby. 91'
Another smoking case with a somewhat different factual set-
ting resulted in a very different conclusion. In Ricci v. American
Airlines19 2 the defendant overbooked the flight and in accord-
ance with FAA regulations assigned a non-smoker to a seat in
the smoking section. A physical and verbal altercation erupted
between the non-smoking passenger and the plaintiff, who was
smoking his second cigarette of the flight.19 In both Ravreby
and Ricci, the airline and the plaintiff had complied with federal
regulations. The Ricci court held that the airline's policy did not
adequately protect against a foreseeable "flareup between a mili-
tant nonsmoker and an intransigent smoker in the situation
[the airline] created," and did not include "appropriate safe-
guards to prevent it."' 94
Applying Ravreby's three factors to EMI indicates the airline
would probably be held liable for the resulting injuries. First,
while perhaps statistically unlikely, the danger of EMI would
probably not be considered "remote," given the anecdotal and
189 Id.
190 Id. (quoting 38 Fed. Reg. 12210 (1973)) (stating that the airline could des-
ignate the seats "in such a manner as to minimize, to the greatest practicable
extent, points of contact between smokers and non-smokers").
191 Ravreby, 293 N.W.2d at 266. The court also rejected Dr. Ravreby's claim that
United had breached its duty to protect passengers from the harmful or offensive
conduct of fellow passengers, noting that the airline had taken "reasonably ap-
propriate steps to minimize likely harm." Id.
192 544 A.2d 428 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.), cert. denied, 552 A.2d 165 (N.J.
1988).
193 The non-smoker first asked the plaintiff to refrain from smoking. The
plaintiff refused but did agree to sit facing the'aisle to limit his seatmate's expo-
sure to secondhand smoke. The non-smoker grabbed the cigarette out of the
plaintiff's mouth and a scuffle ensued.
19 544 A.2d at 431 (emphasis added). In applying a standard of reasonable
foreseeability, the court held that "American knew or should have known that
overbooking, switched seats and the separation of parties, in themselves, are anxi-
ety producing situations which could well have exacerbated ordinary tensions."
Id. As long as the defendant's conduct was a substantial factor in bringing about
the injury, and the airline knew or should have known that some injury might
occur, its ignorance about any particular passenger's propensities for violence or
other unacceptable behavior was irrelevant. Id.
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scientific evidence. The issue is one of concern in both the trade
and popular media and airlines are well aware of it.'95 The true
nature and measure of the risk of EMI is unknown. The poten-
tially catastrophic harm that EMI could cause might tend to out-
weigh its statistical remoteness and tip the balance in favor of a
duty to eliminate-not just minimize-the risk by prohibiting
the use of PEDs at any time during the flight.
Second, the airlines' PED policies undoubtedly inconven-
ience some passengers, though they are actually only losing a
few minutes of computing time. When given a choice between a
safe flight or maximum productivity, presumably even the most
driven executive would turn off the laptop.
Third, like the flexible smoking regulations at issue in
Ravreby, FAR section 91.21 gives airlines discretion to allow pas-
senger use of personal electronic devices. 196 FAR section 91.21
also requires the airline or pilot to determine that a particular
device will not cause EMI. 197 This determination should be
based on something more than conjecture. Airlines would prob-
ably bear the risk of an erroneous conclusion, given the high
standard of care that applies to common carriers. Further, the
Ravreby court noted that the smoking regulations did not pur-
port to eliminate all contact between smoking and non-smoking
passengers.1 98 By contrast, FAR section 91.21 does not appear to
contemplate an acceptable level of EMI.199 Looking at all three
factors together indicates an airline's claim of complete compli-
ance with all applicable FAA regulations would not be enough
to alleviate liability.
A Ricci approach might yield a similar finding of airline liabil-
ity but for different reasons. There, the court emphasized the
airline's role in exacerbating the ordinary tensions of its passen-
gersY.2 ° An EMI plaintiff might argue that airline advertising
which targets business passengers with promises of a flying of-
fice 20 1 creates an environment encouraging passengers to use
laptop computors or cellular ph6nes throughout the flight. Air-
lines, however, may point to limits on PEDs during take-offs and
195 See supra notes 30-42 and accompanying text.
196 Id.
197 Portable Electronic Devices, 14 C.F.R. § 91.21(b)(5) (1995).
198 Ravreby, 293 N.W.2d at 265.
199 Portable Electronic Devices, 14 C.F.R. § 91.21(b) (5) (regulation does not
qualify the term "interference").
200 Ricci, 544 A.2d at 431.
201 See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
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landings as evidence that their primary goal is to ensure flight
safety, not the maximum business productivity of their passen-
gers. Such an argument seems unavailing given that foreseeabil-
ity is a key component in determining airline liability.
3. Where Flight Attendants Instruct Passengers to Stop Using Their
PEDs but Fail to Ensure Passenger Compliance
A passenger's failure to turn off a PED after being directed to
do so raises some of the same issues discussed previously in the
analysis of the overhead bin cases. In both scenarios, one passen-
ger's foreseeable negligence results in injury to another. In sev-
eral of the falling baggage suits, however (Andrews, Haley,
Rodriguez Pardo, Schwamb, and Brosnahan), the flight attendants
were not directly involved in the respective incidents. Despite
the attendants' lack of direct involvement, in three of the five
cases the plaintiff either won a jury verdict or survived the de-
fendant's motion for summary judgment.202
Once a flight attendant does more than make standard safety
announcements regarding a harmful event, a finding of liability
appears to be unavoidable. For example, in USAir, Inc. v.
United States Department of the Navy20 3 a passenger had care-
lessly stowed his briefcase in the overhead bin without any assist-
ance from the flight crew °.2  He knew the briefcase was unstable
when he closed the bin. A flight attendant later opened the bin,
and the briefcase fell on another passenger. The only evidence
of negligence on the part of the flight attendant was testimony
that she was not looking at the bin when she opened it.2 05 The
court of appeals held that "the flight attendant's actions
202 Andrews v. United Airlines, Inc., 24 F.3d 39, 42 (9th Cir. 1994) (reversed
summary judgment for defendant); Brosnahan v. Western Air Lines, Inc., 892
F.2d 730, 734 (8th Cir. 1989) (reinstatement of jury verdict for plaintiff after
district court's grant ofjudgment notwithstanding the verdict); Schwamb v. Delta
Air Lines, 516 So. 2d 452, 468 (La. Ct. App..1987) (affirmedjury award for plain-
tiff), writ denied, 520 So. 2d 750 (Ky. 1988). In the remaining two cases, Haley v.
United Airlines, Inc., 728 F. Supp. 374 (D. Md. 1989), and Rodriguez Pardo v.
Delta Airlines, Inc., 767 F. Supp. 26 (DP.R. 1991), the plaintiffs could not over-
come the defendants' evidence that the flight attendant acted to prevent the
harmful acts of another passenger, if there was time to do so.
203 14 F.3d 1410 (9th Cir. 1994).
204 The passenger who placed the briefcase in the bin was a civilian employee
of the U.S. Department of the Navy traveling in the course of his employment.
The plaintiff and his wife sued USAir in state court. The jury found USAir liable,
and the airline settled for $550,000. USAir then sued the Navy for indemnity
under the Federal Tort Claims Act. Id. at 1411-12.
205 Id. at 1411.
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breached the common carrier's duty of utmost care."2 °6 Actu-
ally, the result could have been even worse for the airline. The
district court found that the flight attendant's actions were a su-
perseding cause of the plaintiff's injuries and completely re-
lieved the third party passenger of liability for his careless
storing of the briefcase. 20 7 The Ninth Circuit reversed that hold-
ing as clear error2 08 and remanded the case to the district court
for an "apportionment of damages between USAir and the De-
partment of the Navy as concurrent causes of [plaintiffs] ifijury,
keeping in mind USAir's elevated standard of care." 2 9
An airline's practice of relying on the passengers'judgment210
will almost certainly be inadequate, as will a failure to specifi-
cally warn passengers about foreseeable hazards211 that apply
equally to all passengers.212 Human nature tends to tempt peo-
ple to test the boundaries of any rule. As such, it seems likely
that passengers will attempt to use PEDs even when they are not
authorized to do so.
Extending the analysis to PEDs and EMI indicates that the
flight attendants should first instruct passengers to turn off their
devices during take-offs and landings. The directive should spe-
cifically name the prohibited devices in order to eliminate any
ambiguity. The flight attendants should then a walk down the
aisle to confirm that the passengers have complied with the in-
struction. The burden of this procedure would be relatively
206 Id. at 1414.
207 Id. at 1412.
208 The Ninth Circuit held that the flight attendant's negligence was not a su-
perseding cause because it was reasonably foreseeable at the time the passenger
carelessly stowed his briefcase that someone subsequently would open the over-
head bin and the briefcase would fall out. Id. at 1414.
209 Id.
210 Schwamb, 516 So. 2d at 463 (flight attendant stated that Delta relied "on the
good judgment of a passenger not to close [the bin] when it is not correctly
filled.").
211 Id. Delta warned passengers only to be certain that all carry-on luggage was
stowed either above or below the seats. Id. at 463 n.8. Plaintiff suggested numer-
ous ways in which Delta could have minimized the risk of harm, such as requiring
passengers to leave the overhead bins open prior to take-off. The flight attendant
could then check every bin to make sure its contents were stored properly. Id.
212 Airlines need not "warn of hazards that vary according to the particular
condition of the passenger." Sprayregen v. American Airlines, Inc., 570 F. Supp.
16, 18 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (no duty to warn of dangers of flying with a head cold). But
see Kohler v. Aspen Airways, Inc., 214 Cal. Rptr. 720, 725-26(Cal. Ct. App. 1985)
(no duty to warn passengers of the possibility of clear air turbulence, absent evi-




small because the attendants must currently perform a visual in-
spection to ensure that seats are upright, tray tables are stowed,
and seat belts are fastened.
V. CONCLUSION
The idea that devices as seemingly harmless as laptop com-
puters and FM radios might create chaos with aircraft systems
has generated extensive, and sometimes unsubstantiated, cover-
age in the popular press. Lost in the uproar is the fact that,
more than thirty years after the issue first arose, there still is no
conclusive scientific data to either establish or repudiate the no-
tion that an aircraft filled with passengers using PEDs might veer
wildly off course with disastrous results. Available data indicates
that the chance of EMI during a typical flight is statistically very
small, 213 especially if passengers comply with airline policies and
the device is in- proper working order. Anecdotal evidence sug-
gests that the chance of EMI disruption is greater than one in
one million, but reporting biases may lead pilots to erroneously
attribute incidents to EMI that actually result from pilot error or
mechanical malfunction. In any event, it is virtually impossible
to recreate the conditions that allegedly caused the EMI. There
is fairly persuasive evidence that personal cellular phones, which
FCC regulations and airline policies bar from use at any time
during the flight, pose a risk of EMI because of their high emis-
sion levels at frequencies commonly used by aircraft systems.
Industry participants from airline pilots to federal agencies do
not agree on whether the devices actually threaten cockpit sys-
tems and, if so, what should be done about it. The FAA's con-
servative approach to the issue seems to have succeeded in
avoiding public concern, despite extensive media coverage of
the issue. To date, most passengers have accepted the changes
in airline policies without demanding detailed explanations. De-
velopment of uniform standards for implementing regulations
governing PED use might eliminate some of the passenger con-
fusion resulting from different airlines approaches to enforce-
ment. The FAA's approach also may be partially responsible for
the fact that the issue is unresolved even after thirty years of
periodic study.
It seems only a matter of time before a plaintiff sues an airline
alleging injuries sustained as a result of EMI. Newspaper articles
213 One in one million, or one incident every two years. SPECIAL COMMIrEE
156, supra note 31, at 91.
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have already raised the issue in connection with major airplane
crashes. The plaintiffs complaint could include allegations of
hazardous EMI along with the familiar charges of pilot error,
inadequate training, and other negligent acts and omissions.
Few flight hazards are truly analogous to EMI although falling
luggage and smoking cases might provide a logical starting
point for analysis. As in EMI cases, they involve a risk to passen-
gers that the passengers themselves create. The seat belt/turbu-
lence cases are helpful in determining how a court might
evaluate an airline policy that complies with existing federal reg-
ulations yet still fails to prevent harm to passengers.
Analysis of the EMI issue under the three scenarios (negligent
use of PEDs, inadequate airline policy, and failure to enforce
passenger compliance) indicates that a court is likely to find an
airline liable provided that the plaintiff can prove causation,
which is a substantial obstacle. The high standard of care that
applies to common carriers leads to the conclusion that passen-
gers' negligent use of PEDs is as foreseeable as falling luggage.
As such, the airline must take all practical steps to ensure that
their negligence does not endanger other passengers.
The weakest part of a plaintiffs case is the causation element.
Necessary evidence would probably need to include eyewitness
testimony to establish that one or more passengers used PEDs
during the flight. The plaintiff would then need persuasive sci-
entific data linking the use of the PED to the crash or other
harmful incident. Though a common carrier's standard of care
is high, the scientific uncertainty surrounding the issue of PEDs
on aircraft provides an effective means of attacking the causa-
tion element of the plaintiffs prima facie case.
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